The Anatomy of Web Censorship in Pakistan by Nabi, Zubair
The Anatomy of Web Censorship in Pakistan∗
Zubair Nabi
Information Technology University, Pakistan
zubair.nabi@itu.edu.pk
Abstract
Over the years, the Internet has democratized the flow
of information. Unfortunately, in parallel, authoritarian
regimes and other entities (such as ISPs) for their vested
interests have curtailed this flow by partially or fully cen-
soring the web. The policy, mechanism, and extent of this
censorship varies from country to country.
We present the first study of the cause, effect, and
mechanism of web censorship in Pakistan. Specifically,
we use a publicly available list of blocked websites and
check their accessibility from multiple networks within
the country. Our results indicate that the censorship mech-
anism varies across websites: some are blocked at the
DNS level while others at the HTTP level. Interestingly,
the government shifted to a centralized, Internet exchange
level censorship system during the course of our study, en-
abling our findings to compare two generations of block-
ing systems. Furthermore, we report the outcome of a
controlled survey to ascertain the mechanisms that are be-
ing actively employed by people to circumvent censor-
ship. Finally, we discuss some simple but surprisingly
unexplored methods of bypassing restrictions.
1 Introduction
In recent years, the Internet has faced an onslaught
of censorship and restrictions with local [19, 14] and
global [1] ramifications. The world over, authoritarian
regimes under the pretext of maintaining public order
have been blocking web access. This is more enunci-
ated in the developing world where freedom of speech and
freedom of information are largely undefined. In the same
vein, Pakistan has become a poster-child for web censor-
ship rooted in religion, politics, and conflict/security [16].
It has also been revealed as one of the 36 countries which
host FinFisher Command & Control servers to spy on
their citizens [13].
According to a 2012 World Bank study, 9% or around
16 million Pakistanis have access to the Internet [20]. Out
of these 16 million users, 64% employ the Internet to ac-
∗To appear in: Proceedings of the 3rd USENIX Workshop on
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cess news websites [22]. Therefore, the government has a
high incentive to stifle this access. Practically, filtering in
Pakistan is largely geared towards blocking content which
is considered a threat to national security and/or content
which is blasphemous. The largest Internet Exchange
Point (IXP) in the country is owned by the state which
simplifies the enforcement of state-wide censorship. This
censorship has been applied in waves during the past one
decade—often mandated by the judiciary [16]. The side-
effects of which at times have had global impact. For in-
stance in 2008, a naive attempt to censor YouTube by the
authorities, rendered the website unreachable for a large
number of ASes across the world [5].
A large number of studies have recently been conducted
to study the mechanism and effect of censorship around
the world. Verkamp and Gupta [19] used PlanetLab nodes
and volunteer machines to study the mechanisms of cen-
sorship in 11 countries. One of their key insights is that
these mechanisms vary from country to country. Simi-
larly, Mathrani and Alipour [14] presented the results of
tests conducted across 10 countries using private VPNs
and volunteer nodes. Their results show that restrictions
in these countries are applicable to all categories of web-
sites: politics, social networking, culture, news, entertain-
ment, and religion. Likewise, Dainotti et al. [9] made use
of publicly accessible datasets to dissect the Internet out-
ages in Libya and Egypt during the Arab Spring. In the
same vein, a large body of work [21, 7, 8, 1] is dedicated
to analyzing the modus operandi and consequence of cen-
sorship due to the Great Firewall of China.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to
dissect in detail the mechanism and effect of censorship
in Pakistan. Unlike studies conducted for other countries
which relied on volunteer machines and PlanetLab nodes,
we directly use 5 different networks within Pakistan as
vantage points to carry out our tests. More importantly,
during the course of our tests the country underwent an
upgrade to a central and standardized censorship system,
reportedly developed by the Canadian firm Netsweeper
Inc.1 [18]. Therefore, our results juxtapose two genera-
1The same firm has in the past provided its filtering services to Qatar,
the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Yemen [18].
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tions of systems. Moreover, we present the outcome of a
controlled survey to gauge the mechanisms through which
citizens are currently circumventing online blockages. Fi-
nally, we augment these mechanisms by discussing the
use of CDNs and search engine caches. Our results can
be summarized as follows:
• A large number of websites are blocked using DNS
injection
• The alternative mode of censorship in the previous
system (at the ISP level) was HTTP 302 redirection
and in case of the current system (at the IXP level),
it is fake HTTP response injection
• Websites restricted at the DNS-level are also blocked
at the HTTP-level
• A large fraction of people either use public VPN ser-
vices or web proxies to access restricted content
• CDNs and search engine caches are currently viable
options to access blocked content
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We give a
brief history of Internet censorship in Pakistan in §2. The
methodology employed for our study is discussed in §3.
§4 presents the results of our tests and survey. Alterna-
tive anti-censorship mechanisms are discussed in §5. We
finally conclude in §6 and also discuss future directions.
2 Background
Both telephony and Internet services in Pakistan are
managed by an arm of the state called the Pakistan
Telecommunication Authority (PTA). It is in charge of
regulation and licensing of fixed-line telephony, cellular
services, cable TV, and Internet services within the coun-
try. Internet censorship is also enforced by the govern-
ment through the PTA. To give the reader some perspec-
tive, the following is a timeline of censorship enforced by
the government:
• 2006: 12 websites blocked for hosting blasphe-
mous content. The content which was deemed of-
fensive included a Blogspot blog. Lacking the in-
frastructure to block a particular blog, the entire
Blogspot website was blocked for two months.
• 2008: A number of YouTube videos marked as of-
fensive by the government. Instead of implement-
ing a URL/IP-specific restriction, an IP-wide block
of YouTube via BGP misconfiguration was enforced,
making YouTube inaccessible for much of the Inter-
net for 2 hours [5].
• 2010: Facebook, YouTube, Flickr, and Wikipedia
partially or fully blocked in reaction to “Every-
body Draw Muhammad Day”. These websites
were subsequently unblocked. The same year, the
government also sanctioned the PTA to “order tem-
porary or permanent termination of telecom services
of any service provider, in any part or whole of Pak-
istan” [2].
• 2012 (March): The government requests propos-
als for a country-wide URL filtering and block-
ing system [15]. According to the advertisement,
filtering at the time was enabled by manual mech-
anisms deployed at the ISP level and the desired sys-
tem was required to enable centralized blocking at
the national IP backbone. Some other features2 of
the system included:
– Filtering from domain level to sub-folder level
as well as blocking of individual files and file
types
– Blocking individual IPs and/or an entire range
– Remote network monitoring via SNMP and
configuration through HTTP and HTTPS
– Operation at L2 and L3
– Modularity and scalability through stand-
alone, plug-and-play hardware units capable of
blocking up to 50 million URLs with a process-
ing latency of less than 1ms
– Decoupling of policy and mechanism via stor-
age of blacklists in an external database
• 2012 (September): Indefinite ban on YouTube im-
posed in retaliation to a controversial movie [11].
The side-effects of this ban disrupted other Google
services such as Maps, Drive, Play Store, and Ana-
lytics [4]. This was due to the fact that the same IPs
are shared across all of these services.
3 Methodology
We use a publicly available dataset of websites3 to per-
form connectivity tests. The prime reason for using this
particular dataset is that the same list of 597 websites was
circulated by the PTA to all ISPs for filtering [3]. While
not an exhaustive list, it provides a fairly rich set of both
complete domains and subdomains for analysis.
As the list was compiled in 2010, the status of a number
of websites has changed. For instance, in 2010 the gov-
ernment banned a small number of YouTube videos so the
list contains individual entries for each video. Since then,
the government has blocked YouTube entirely. Therefore
we removed individual video URLs and added a single
entry for YouTube. This reduced the size of the dataset
to 562 links. In addition, the list also contains a number
of duplicate entries. The removal of these entries further
reduced the size of the list to 429. Finally, a number of
websites have now gone offline, mostly proxy sites, bring-
ing down the final tally of test sites to 307. To ensure that
these final websites are actually restricted, we tested their
2This is the first time a government has made the exact requirements
and details of a full-fledged censorship system public.
3http://propakistani.pk/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/
blocked.html
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ID Nature Location
Network1 University Lahore
Network2 University Lahore
Network3 Home Lahore
Network4 Home Islamabad
Network5 Cellular (EDGE) Islamabad
Table 1: Details of Test Networks
connectivity using a public VPN service which terminates
in the US. The results indicate that they are accessible via
VPN and are thus restricted within Pakistan.
3.1 Test Script
Our test script, dubbed Samizdat4, closely mimics the
CensMon [17] system with a few modifications. Unlike
CensMon, our script does not relay test results to a remote
server but logs them locally. Furthermore, it also tries to
perform DNS resolution using public servers in addition
to network-local resolvers. Finally, instead of using a cus-
tom server to determine URL keyword filtering, it uses a
public portal.
The script first downloads the list of websites and car-
ries out the cleaning phase described above. Then for each
website it executes the following tasks:
1. Performs a DNS lookup and notes the returned IP ad-
dress(es). If the lookup fails, the website is marked
as blocked and the returned DNS response, such as
NXDOMAIN, Timeout, etc. is logged. The lookup
is performed for both the local ISP DNS service as
well as a number of public DNS servers: Google
(8.8.8.8), Comodo (8.26.56.26), OpenDNS
(208.67.222.222), Level3 (209.244.0.3), and
Norton (198.153.192.40).
2. If the DNS lookup is successful, it tries to open a
TCP socket to the IP address(es) on port 80 to check
for IP address blacklisting. Any connection failures
are logged.
3. The next step is to check for URL keyword filter-
ing. To this end, the URL of the website is ap-
pended to a scalable and publicly accessible por-
tal: http://www.google.com. The script expects
a HTTP 404 Not Found error under normal oper-
ation. If a different code is received, the website is
marked for URL keyword filtering.
4. The final step is to send an HTTP request to the web-
site. The response, along with its code is logged. In
addition, in case of response code 301 or 302, the
redirection URL (from the Location field) is also
logged.
Additionally, all transient connectivity errors, such as
timeouts, etc. are logged to a separate error log.
4Available online: https://github.com/ZubairNabi/
Samizdat
Mechanism No. of Affected Sites Percent
DNS 187 60.91
IP 0 0
URL-keyword 0 0
HTTP (302) 5 1.62
Total 192 62.53
Table 2: Breakdown of Pre-April Test Results
3.2 Test Networks
Tests were conducted across 5 different networks:
Network1-5. Table 1 gives the details of each network.
Network1 and Network2, due to their academic nature, are
connected to 3 and 2 ISPs, respectively, with gigabit con-
nectivity and auto-failover. Network3 and Network4 on
the other hand are connected to single but distinct ISPs.
Network5, which was only used for post-April testing, is
a cellular network with GPRS-EDGE Internet connectiv-
ity. The test script was executed on hosts within these
networks at night time to minimize interaction with regu-
lar traffic and also to minimize false positives. In addition,
the measurements were performed multiple times and on
separate occasions to ensure precision. Finally, only those
results are being reported for which the error log had no
entries, i.e. there were no transient connectivity issues.
4 Results
In this section, we first present the results of the tests
that we conducted to investigate the mechanism and ex-
tent of censorship in the country (§4.1 and §4.2) followed
by the outcome of our public survey (§4.3).
4.1 Pre-April 2013
Table 2 summarizes the results for all networks. We
discuss each of the mechanisms next.
4.1.1 DNS
Most websites are blocked at the DNS level. Instead of
returning the proper A record, a spoofed “Non-Existent
Domain” (NXDOMAIN) packet is injected and the orig-
inal A record is suppressed, i.e. the actual query re-
sponse is never received by the client. Unlike other
countries, where a warning page is displayed [19], no
such page is displayed in this case, giving the user the
impression that the page actually does not exist. To
gauge if this DNS injection is confined to resolvers
within the country, the test script also attempts to re-
trieve the A record from 5 public DNS servers. A
spoofed NXDOMAIN packet was observed for Google Pub-
lic DNS and Level3 as well, which suggests that DNS
queries are hijacked for both network-local and public
servers. Interestingly, in case of Norton DNS, Comodo
SecureDNS, and OpenDNS, the DNS resolves to the re-
spective service’s NXDOMAIN redirector, 198.153.192.3,
92.242.144.50, and 67.215.65.132, respectively.
This suggests that the censoring system is mindful of the
behaviour of individual resolvers.
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(a) ISP 1
(b) ISP 2
Figure 1: Screenshots of ISP-level Censorship Messages
No. Source IP Destination IP Payload
1. 192.168.15.3 173.194.43.111 GET / HTTP/1.1
2. 173.194.43.111 192.168.15.3 HTTP/1.1 302 Found (text/html)
3. 192.168.15.3 10.16.6.41 GET /redirect.php?n=110.39.241.94@Isb-Dhok-P2&s=124 HTTP/1.1
4. 10.16.6.41 192.168.15.3 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)
5. 192.168.15.3 10.16.6.41 GET /favicon.ico HTTP/1.1
6. 10.16.6.41 192.168.15.3 HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found (text/html)
Table 3: HTTP Packet-level Trace for YouTube, Pre-April
4.1.2 IP and URL-keyword Filtering
Post-DNS resolution, the script was able to connect to
the IPs of all websites on port 80, showing that no IP-
level blacklisting is in place. Similarly, the script received
a 404 Not Found for each website after appending its
URL to www.google.com, indicating that URL keyword
filtering is also not in effect.
4.1.3 HTTP
A large number of websites exhibit normal behaviour
and return either a 200 (OK) or 203 (Non-Authoritative
Information) code. A few sites also have legiti-
mate 301 (Moved Permanently) or 302 (Found) redi-
rects, for instance from http://www.anonymizer.com
to https://www.anonymizer.com/index.html. In
total, 115 websites exhibited normal behaviour and have
thus been unblocked by the authorities since the time the
dataset was compiled.
5 websites, including YouTube, result in redirection to
a warning screen. The warning screen varies from ISP to
ISP (shown in Figure 1) which indicates that this redirec-
tion is done at the ISP-level. Table 3 presents the HTTP
packet level trace5 for YouTube. It is clear from the table
that the HTTP GET request is intercepted and the session is
redirected to a private IP which displays the warning page.
Figure 2 shows the HTTP 302 redirect response packet
in which the Location field contains the redirection IP
for one particular ISP. The same sequence of packets, al-
though with different redirection IPs, was observed on all
5 networks. This censorship is triggered by a combination
of the hostname and object URI (Host and Request URI
fields) within the HTTP request header. We ascertained
this by creating a custom HTTP request header for all 5
websites and sending it to an uncensored URL instead of
5Captured using Wireshark (http://www.wireshark.org/).
the actual one. This resulted in redirection to the warning
page in each case. For instance, setting the hostname as
youtube.com triggers censorship regardless of the des-
tination URL. In contrast, the hostname vimeo.com is
allowed to go through but the hostname in conjunction
with the URI 64414932 experiences redirection. It is also
important to highlight that this censorship is an exam-
ple of “filter and return” as opposed to “allow but return
first” [19], i.e. the original session is disrupted and sup-
pressed by the censoring module.
4.2 Post-April 2013
In May 2013 we serendipitously noticed a new warning
page for YouTube. As a consequence, we re-conducted
all tests. The results of which are summarized in Table 4.
The number of websites affected by DNS, IP, and URL-
keyword based filtering remained largely the same. In
contrast, websites which experienced HTTP 302 redirec-
tion are now displaying a different warning page (shown
in Figure 3) without any explicit redirection. Packet level
inspection revealed that the legitimate HTTP response is
being replaced with a spoofed response which displays
the said page. Table 5 shows the sequence of HTTP pack-
ets for YouTube. Instead of the actual response, a packet
with the content of the warning page and status code 200
is injected. The restriction system uses the first HTTP GET
request as a censoring trigger based on the hostname and
URI, similar to the mechanism discussed in the previous
section. The status code of 200 makes the browser be-
lieve that it is a normal response, thus restricting it from
fetching content from the intended destination (YouTube
in this case). As a result, the actual TCP connection es-
tablished with YouTube will eventually timeout for lack
of activity. Figure 4 presents the HTTP response message
received for all websites which experienced this category
4
Figure 2: HTTP 302 Redirect Response for YouTube, Pre-April
Figure 3: Censorship Warning Page, Post-April 2013
of censorship. The Last-Modified field of the response
contains the value Fri, 19 Apr 2013 which we suspect
is the date this new system came into effect. Moreover,
all of our test networks experienced the same censorship
mechanism and had the same warning page, except for
Network4 which was still under the influence of ISP-level
filtering. This has two main implications: (1) The country
has moved from fragmented ISP-level to IXP-level filter-
ing, and (2) The transition from the old system to the new
one is taking place in phases.
Mechanism No. of Affected Sites Percent
DNS 179 58.30
IP 0 0
URL-keyword 0 0
HTTP (200) 5 1.62
Total 184 59.92
Table 4: Breakdown of Post-April Test Results
4.3 Survey
Having worked out the censorship mechanisms, we
conducted a controlled survey to ascertain the tools people
are using to circumvent censorship in the country. Due to
the sensitive nature of the subject matter we only shared
it with personal contacts. Figure 5 presents the results
for 67 respondents, mostly fellow computer scientists.
Public VPN services are predominantly used; accounting
for around 45%. Specifically, Hotspot Shield6 and Spot-
flux7—both of which provide free VPN services through
client applications—are popular choices. Web proxies
(24%) and HTTP proxies (11%), such as Ultrasurf8 also
have a substantial user-base. It is noteworthy that the re-
spondents are more technically aware than the average cit-
izen and thus the results might be biased towards solutions
6http://www.hotspotshield.com/
7http://www.spotflux.com/
8https://ultrasurf.us/
Figure 4: HTTP Response for YouTube, Post-April
that require above average computer skills.
Figure 5: Survey Results
5 Alternative Circumvention Mechanisms
In this section we discuss some alternative methods
of bypassing restrictions. We first analyze web-based
DNS lookup followed by content distribution networks
and search engine caches.
5.1 Web-based DNS Lookup
A well-known mechanism to bypass DNS-based filter-
ing is to use a public DNS service [19]. Our findings indi-
cate that Pakistan also injects a fake DNS response for
public DNS services, thus negating their use. Another
means to resolve hostnames to IPs is to use an online
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No. Source IP Destination IP Payload
1. 192.168.43.112 173.194.35.100 GET / HTTP/1.1
2. 173.194.35.100 192.168.43.112 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)
3. 192.168.43.112 173.194.35.100 GET /favicon.ico HTTP/1.1
4. 173.194.35.100 192.168.43.112 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (image/x-icon)
Table 5: HTTP Packet-level Trace for YouTube, Post-April
service. To check if this was a viable option to bypass
filtering, we wrote a script to, (1) resolve hostnames to
IPs using an online service9, and (2) use a custom HTTP
header to fetch the webpage. The custom HTTP header is
necessary as many multi-service sites share the same IPs
across many of their services. For instance, Google uses
the same set of IPs for YouTube, Drive, etc. Therefore,
these resolved IPs cannot be used as drop-in replacements
for hostnames. To remedy this, the HTTP header needs
to contain the service name within its Host field. Our re-
sults show that all websites which experience DNS-based
censorship, are also censored using secondary mecha-
nisms (similar to South Korea [19]): HTTP 302 redirec-
tion in case of the pre-April system and fake HTTP 200
response in case of the current post-April system. This
also rules out the use of user-generated content [6, 12] to
host DNS records. Furthermore, according to Verkamp
and Gupta [19], South Korea makes use of DNS filtering
for DNS entries that resolve to a single site. Whereas for
IPs which are shared across several hostnames and the fil-
tering needs to be selective, the HTTP-level mechanism
is used. We found a similar pattern in our tests. For in-
stance, multi-IP and multi-service sites such as YouTube
and Wikipedia are only blocked at the HTTP-level while
others are blocked at both levels.
5.2 Content Distribution Networks
CDNs have increased the availability, reliability, and
performance of the web by geo-caching content. To
check if any of the blocked websites were accessi-
ble through CDNs, we tried to fetch them from the
peer-to-peer CoralCDN10. Websites are coralized by ap-
pending .nyud.net to the hostname. For instance,
http://google.com.nyud.net is the coralized version
of http://google.com. The original test script was
modified to attempt to fetch each website from Coral-
CDN. The results indicate that all 307 websites are acces-
sible through this method. Previous studies have already
shown that CoralCDN is being used to bypass censorship
in some areas [10].
5.3 Search Engine Caches
Search engines usually cache snapshots of indexed
pages. These can readily be accessed online. In case of
Google, this requires pre-pending cache: to the URL.
We checked the status of all 307 websites from our dataset
and found out that all of them are accessible through the
9http://ping.eu/nslookup/
10http://www.coralcdn.org/
Google cache. Bing and Internet Archive11 also yielded
similar results.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
We presented the first study of the cause, effect, and
mechanism of Internet censorship in Pakistan. During the
course of our work, in April 2013, the country underwent
an upgrade from ISP-level blocking to a centralized sys-
tem, allowing us to juxtapose two different generations of
techniques. Our discovery of the upgrade to IXP-level fil-
tering is consistent with the findings of a study conducted
by the Citizen Lab [18], coincidentally around the same
time. To work out the specifics of restrictions, we used
a publicly available list of 307 websites. For diversity
and precision, 5 distinct networks from within the country
were employed. Our results show that DNS injection is
the predominant mechanism for blocking websites. This
is applicable to both local DNS resolvers as well as public
resolvers such as Google DNS and OpenDNS. The next
line of censorship is at the HTTP-level. In case of the
pre-April scheme, HTTP 302 redirection is used to disrupt
and suppress sessions and in the post-April scheme, a fake
HTTP 200 response packet is injected to give the browser
the illusion that the session has been completed. In ad-
dition, websites blocked at the DNS-level also experience
restrictions at the HTTP-level. Furthermore, the outcome
from our controlled survey shows that public VPN ser-
vices and web proxies are the two most popular tools to
bypass restrictions. Finally, we showed that CDNs and
search engine caches are simple but surprisingly unex-
plored means of accessing blocked content.
This work provided an initial window into the Internet
censorship regime in Pakistan but a complete picture re-
quires an expansion in the number of test websites as well
as networks, which constitutes our future work. Further-
more, it is also not clear how the censoring module deter-
mines the exact NXDOMAIN redirector for public DNS re-
solvers, i.e. whether it maintains a list of all resolvers and
their redirectors or it queries the actual resolver to obtain
its redirector upon each lookup. Additionally, our future
work also includes the examination of the side-effects of
DNS injection on the same lines as [1].
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